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I. INTRODUCTION 
Class actions, like other forms of aggregate litigation, present a 
challenge to the notion of individualism, which dominates the common 
conception of civil litigation in the United States. In particular, mass 
litigation creates serious agency problems and lack of participation by 
individual class members in a process that may influence their rights.1 
* Assistant Professor Sapir Academic College School of Law, Israel. For their invaluable advice
during the work on this project I am deeply grateful to Oscar Chase, Peggy Cooper Davis, Tom Tyler, 
and Joseph W. W. Weiler. My eternal gratitude, for making this project possible, goes to Aelia 
Akerman, Amikam Kovner and Eran Zimmerman. 
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One of the tools offered by the legislature in order to overcome these 
difficulties is the fairness hearing. Fairness hearings are held when parties 
to a class action reach a settlement. Before a class settlement is approved, 
the court must hold a public hearing to examine whether the settlement 
arrived at by defendant and class counsel is “fair, reasonable and 
adequate.”2 The fairness hearing is intended to provide any individual that 
might be affected by a settlement with an opportunity to publicly support 
or oppose it.3 In the hearing, the court should serve as the guardian of the 
class members’ rights and interests by considering the extent of their 
representation and examining both the process through which the 
settlement was reached and the adequacy of the settlement’s terms in light 
of the strengths and weaknesses of the legal claims of the class.4 
Despite its potential importance, in practice, the fairness hearing is 
generally considered to have failed as a procedural tool for protecting the 
interests of class members and mitigating agency problems.5 Class 
members usually lack incentives to participate and oversee the work of 
the lawyers. Therefore, objections to class action settlements are usually 
infrequent6 and, in many cases, not even one class member attends the 
hearing. Those who do choose to participate face problems due to lack of 
information and expertise that limit their ability to meaningfully oppose 
the settlement. Moreover, in many cases, the court itself is involved in the 
process leading to the settlement and is therefore invested and motivated 
to accept the very settlement it should examine carefully.7 This could 
1. Martin H. Redish, Wholesale Justice: Constitutional Democracy and the Problem of the
Class Action Lawsuit 86 (2009); Alon Klement, Who Should Guard the Guardians? A New Approach 
for Monitoring Class Action Lawyers, 21 Rev. Litig. 25, 51-52 (2002); Judith Resnik, Dennis E. Curtis 
& Deborah R. Hensler, Individuals Within the Aggregate: Relationships, Representation, and Fees, 
71 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 296, 359 (1996). 
2. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2).
3. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide other balances and safeguards to protect class 
members’ rights, such as the mandatory notice mechanism (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)), or the right to 
opt out (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(v), and 23(e)(4)).  
4. This review is highly important because when a class action ends in a settlement, an
important feature of the legal process, namely ‘adverseness,’ is missing, thus diminishing the court’s 
ability to observe the merits of the lawsuit or the work of class counsel. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., 
The Settlement Black Box, 75 B.U. L. Rev. 1257, 1270 (1995); William W. Schwarzer, Settlement of 
Mass Tort Class Actions: Order Out of Chaos, 80 Cornell L. Rev. 837, 842 (1995); Sanford I. 
Weisburst, Judicial Review of Settlements and Consent Decrees: An Economic Analysis, 28 J. Legal 
Stud. 55, 56 (1999).  
5. William B. Rubenstein, The Fairness Hearing: Adversarial and Regulatory Approaches, 
53 UCLA L. Rev. 1435, 1437-38 (2006). 
6. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Role of Opt-Outs and Objectors in Class
Action Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 1529, 1533 (2004).  
7. Peter H. Schuck, The Role of Judges in Settling Complex Cases: The Agent Orange
Example, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 337, 337 (1986).  
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evoke the claim that the court’s decision in the fairness hearing is a 
foregone decision meant to create the mere appearance that class members 
actually have a say in the litigation process. Based on these characteristics, 
scholars have come to doubt the protective nature or value of these 
hearings for absent class members, describing the fairness hearing as a 
“peculiar juridical moment,”8 that lies “at best, at the periphery and not 
the core of adversarial procedure.”9 
Employing a unique methodology for analyzing court transcripts, 
this study offers a renewed evaluation of the function and socio-legal 
meaning of the fairness hearing. Through a close examination of hearings 
held in three different class actions, I examined and recorded what 
actually happened when legal procedures opened up to allow specific 
participation of litigants during the fairness hearing, that is, what 
happened when individuals were offered the opportunity to speak freely 
about the proposed settlement in a class action case, what characterized 
the discourse and interactions that evolved in these communications by 
absent class members, and whether this form of participation had any 
impact on the outcome of the cases. The analysis of original data, studied 
here for the first time, reveals aspects of the fairness hearing that have not 
been discussed in the literature thus far. Based on a close examination of 
the hearings, I make the claim that while the participation of individual 
class members in these events may not have had a strong legal impact (i.e., 
influencing the legal outcome), it still had a significant socio-legal 
meaning, in, among other things, providing an opportunity for interaction 
between lay and legal actors and offering a forum for public deliberation 
regarding issues of great social importance and great personal importance 
to the class members. 
Fairness hearings provide a venue for direct, unmitigated 
participation of litigants, thus creating a distinctive forum for public 
deliberation and direct interaction of legal and non-legal actors within a 
formal legal setting. The transcripts of the hearings in three different 
cases, presented here for the first time, provide a rare set of data in the 
study of legal institutions. The transcripts record numerous accounts of 
individuals who were given the unusual opportunity to speak freely about 
their understanding of a legal matter. The transcripts examined here 
present a substantial body of information about what individuals choose 
to say before a formal court and how they express themselves in that 
8. Rubenstein, supra note 5, at 1437.
9. William B. Rubenstein, A Transactional Model of Adjudication, 89 Geo. L.J. 371, 413
(2001).  
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setting. The informality of the fairness hearing setting (there is no oath or 
evidentiary constraint) produces accounts that are constrained mainly by 
what the participants themselves perceive as the appropriate way to 
approach the court and by what they consider to be relevant to the 
resolution of the case. The transcripts hence reveal how individuals 
actually conduct themselves within the legal sphere, how “real” judges 
react when confronted with lay perceptions of justice and the law, and 
how the legal system maintains its legitimacy in the face of the demands 
of litigants. 
While the right to participate—to be heard, and “have your day in 
court”—is well established, the form of the legal process often fails to 
provide opportunities for meaningful participation and communication by 
parties involved and affected by the process. This is especially true of 
mass litigation, which presents one of the least participatory forms of 
adjudication. 
The following analysis of fairness hearing transcripts is situated both 
within socio-legal studies and mass litigation scholarship. It combines 
questions concerning the actual function of the fairness hearing within the 
procedural design of the class action mechanism with broader questions 
concerning the participation of lay people within legal procedures. In 
examining the fairness hearings, I explore the degree to which this specific 
legal setting allows for a meaningful inclusion of lay perceptions of the 
participants therein. Whether participation is meaningful or not is related, 
firstly, to its “legal effectiveness,” meaning whether the inclusion of 
participants’ perceptions has the ability to influence the outcome and 
actually does influence the outcome. However, because legal procedures 
serve different social and personal functions in addition to reaching legal 
outcomes, the examination of participation will not be limited to this 
question. The following empirical examination of the hearings, instead, 
frames larger questions regarding lay participation in legal procedures and 
individual participation in mass litigation through three additional 
modules: voice, interaction, and deliberation. 
Most directly, the question of lay participation is related to the 
experiences of those individuals who take part in and are affected by the 
legal process. This study is not aimed at individuals’ perceptions as such, 
but rather at the way these perceptions are manifested within legal 
settings. At the same time, my construction of the notion of participation 
is greatly informed by the significance attributed to the value of 
expression (or voice) in the psychological study of litigants. Procedural 
justice research has repeatedly affirmed the importance of individuals 
taking part in procedures that influence their lives, expressing themselves, 
4
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voicing their concerns, and being treated with respect by decision 
makers.10 People want to tell their stories, but mostly, they want to be 
heard. Indeed, “words are active insofar as they are employed by persons 
in relationship, insofar as they are granted power in human interchange.”11 
Any assessment of forms of lay participation must take into account the 
relational elements of the process and acknowledge the interpersonal 
meanings generated within the courtroom reality.12 This study, therefore, 
pays close attention to the types of interactions that develop within the 
class action fairness hearings between judges and litigants as well as 
between judges and attorneys. 
Finally, in my review of the hearings, I ask questions aimed at 
understanding and evaluating the degree to which these events provide 
opportunities for meaningful deliberation among all participants.13 While 
courts are designed as forums of deliberation based on the idea that 
substantive justice will emerge from the presentation of arguments by 
both sides, both the content and the form of legal deliberation are highly 
regulated and limited. Concerns regarding deliberation within the 
courtroom can ultimately be reduced to the following questions: Who has 
the opportunity to speak and to be heard and thus influence the decision 
maker? How inclusive and responsive is the legal environment? What 
argumentative forms are acceptable within the process? Owen Fiss states 
that the legitimacy of the courts depends on the feature of “dialogue which 
judges must conduct: they must listen to all grievances, hear a wide range 
of interests, [and] speak back.”14 This notion of dialogue is crucial in the 
deliberative sense as well as the relational sense; not only does it require 
that litigants are able to participate in the process, but also that there is 
10. See generally John Thibaut & Laurens Walker, A Theory of Procedure, 66 Calif. L. Rev.
541 (1978); E. Allan Lind & Tom R. Tyler, The Social Psychology of Procedural Justice (1988); 
Tamara Relis, “It’s Not about the Money!”: A Theory on Misconceptions of Plaintiffs’ Litigation 
Aims, 8 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 701 (2007). 
11. Kenneth J. Gergen, Realities and Relationships: Soundings in Social Construction 47
(1994). 
12. Looking at the relational, interpersonal dimensions of the legal process is informed by
relational theories in psychology, which focus on the central and critical role that connections with 
others play in our lives and wellbeing. Stephen A. Mitchell, Relationality: From Attachment to 
Intersubjectivity 31 (2000); Jean Baker Miller, Toward a New Psychology of Women 83 (1976). 
13. Deliberative theorists maintain that decisions should not be made unless all those affected 
by them have the opportunity to meaningfully participate in the decision-making process. This is the 
principle of consent and true participation by the governed, otherwise defined by Habermas as the 
principle of “self-determination.” Namely, that “citizens should always be able to understand 
themselves also as authors of the law to which they are subject as addressees.” Jürgen Habermas, 
Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy 449 (1992).  
14. Owen M. Fiss, The Social and Political Foundations of Adjudication, 6 Law & Hum.
Behav. 121, 125 (1982). 
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communication among all participants, which requires a shared language. 
This Article, thus, explores, through the use of fairness hearing 
transcripts of three different cases, the extent to which communication 
between absent class members, attorneys, and the judge in the fairness 
hearing context, (1) permits participants to affect the outcome of the 
proceedings; (2) provides participants an important forum in which to tell 
their stories; (3) contributes to effective dialogue between legal and 
nonlegal actors; and (4) provides a public forum in which participants may 
tell their personal or group-related stories and contribute to the historical 
record and social memory of the events underlying the lawsuit. I conclude, 
in part, that participation of absent class members in fairness hearings has 
and will likely continue to have minimal impact on the substantive 
elements of the settlement, largely because of the complexity of the claims 
and the significant investment of lawyers and judges in the proposed 
settlement. Nevertheless, there is value in lay participation in fairness 
hearings by absent class members when the court accords respect to the 
lay participants and permits relatively free expression. That value lies in, 
among other things, satisfying the class members’ psychological need to 
be heard; allowing participants to take part in proceedings that affect their 
lives; allowing for a dialogue between legal and nonlegal actors about 
what law is and what it can and cannot do; and enabling lay expression to 
become part of the social meanings and historical narratives that the legal 
process generates and records, particularly since class actions often 
address significant social events. In short, lay participation in the fairness 
hearing permits absent class members – who have so little role in the rest 
of the adjudicatory process of their claims – to have a measure of input 
into the truth-seeking, lawmaking, norm-generation, public debate, and 
reflection over issues that are important to them and, often, are also of 
public significance. 
II. CASES AND METHODOLOGY
A. The Cases 
This study examines fairness hearings held in three different class 
actions. The first is the Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation 
(hereinafter the Agent Orange case). This was a large-scale class action 
filed in 1979 by Vietnam veterans and their wives and children against 
seven American chemical companies that were involved in the 
manufacturing and distribution of Agent Orange—an herbicide used by 
the U.S. army during the Vietnam War. Agent Orange was extensively 
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sprayed in Vietnam in order to defoliate roadsides and jungle areas to 
assist the military efforts of the American forces. Vietnam veterans filed 
the suit claiming that their exposure to Agent Orange (which contained 
dioxin, a highly toxic chemical) was causing them various illnesses as 
well as physical and emotional disabilities. Veterans were suffering from 
high rates of cancer and skin diseases, some fathered babies with various 
birth defects, and their wives suffered from high rates of miscarriages. Yet 
the Department of Veterans Affairs would not recognize their cases as 
service-related.15 While veterans were certain of the cause of their 
suffering, scientific proof of the connection between exposure to Agent 
Orange and physical illness was weak. 
After five years of pre-trial procedures, on the day that the jury trial 
was about to open in the District Court in Brooklyn, Judge Weinstein 
announced that the case had settled.16 The chemical companies had agreed 
to establish a fund of $180 million, which at that time was the largest 
award ever to be won by a class in a mass tort case, but was also certainly 
a seemingly insignificant sum given the over 200,000 class members and 
the severe disabilities suffered by them. 
The settlement proved to be highly controversial among the class 
members. Judge Weinstein, in an exceptional order, held not one hearing 
but eleven days of hearings in five different cities across the country. More 
than 500 class members spoke in these hearings, which lasted from early 
in the morning until late at night. Many veterans came in their old 
uniforms or wearing an orange ribbon on their clothes. A study published 
during the period of the hearings found that the amount of dioxin (the 
deadly component) in the herbicide sprayed in Vietnam was minimal. The 
New York Times published an editorial calling the veterans to take the 
money offered to them and run.17 And yet, most veterans who testified 
opposed the settlement, and outside the courthouse veterans were 
15. Several years after the case was settled, Congress enacted the Agent Orange Act of 1991,
which provides that veterans would be eligible for treatment for a list of presumptive medical 
conditions related to exposure to herbicides used during the war. Pub. L. 102-4, 105 Stat. 11. 
16. The Settlement was practically made possible, and even constructed to some extent, by
Judge Weinstein himself. On the weekend before the trial was to begin, Weinstein ordered the parties 
to come to the courthouse in Brooklyn for an around-the-clock negotiation marathon. Weinstein told 
the plaintiffs’ attorneys that while his heart bled for deformed children, he actually considered their 
case “very weak,” and predicted they would lose and go bankrupt. To the defendants’ attorneys, he 
said that the jury would probably be sympathetic to the veterans who served voluntarily and were now 
sick with cancer, and of course towards their sick children. Some argue that Weinstein himself even 
determined the final figure of $180 million. Wilbur J. Scott, Vietnam Veterans Since the War: the 
Politics of PTSD, Agent Orange, and the National Memorial 185 (2004); see also Peter H. Schuck, 
Agent Orange on Trial: Mass Toxic Disasters in the Courts 143-167(1986). 
17. The Truth About Agent Orange, N.Y. Times, August 13, 1984, at A22.
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demonstrating against the settlement wearing “sprayed and betrayed” 
orange t-shirts18 
I present an analysis of the last two days of hearings, held in San 
Francisco, on August 23 and 24, 1984. During these two days, 92 class 
members spoke, most of them Vietnam veterans and a few wives and 
mothers of veterans. Sixteen lawyers participated, five of whom were 
themselves veterans. Following the hearings Judge Weinstein approved 
the settlement.19 
The second fairness hearing I present took place as part of the 
Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation, (hereinafter referred to as the 
Holocaust Assets case) and generally known as the Swiss Banks case. 
This class action included several lawsuits filed by Holocaust survivors 
and heirs of Holocaust victims against Swiss banks, claiming that by 
concealing and confiscating assets of Holocaust victims and laundering 
the money obtained through Nazi looting, the banks had, in effect, 
collaborated with the Nazi regime in its furtherance of war crimes against 
humanity. Class members in this case resided in over 50 countries around 
the world. But interestingly, due to unique features of the American legal 
system,20 the suits against the Swiss banks (as well as other Holocaust era 
cases21) were filed in American courts many years after, and far away 
from, where the atrocities actually occurred. The unique role of the 
American courts in the Holocaust era litigation would prove significant in 
the following analysis. In the other two cases (the Agent Orange case 
discussed above and the Connecticut Welfare Case discussed below), 
which involved American governmental institutions, the court was at least 
partly associated with the defendants. In the Holocaust Assets case, by 
contrast, class members regarded the American judge and the American 
justice system as, at the least, removed and unbiased, and at the most, as 
the real heroes of the case. 
In the Holocaust Assets case too, a settlement was reached after 
lengthy negotiations.22 The Swiss banks had agreed to pay $1.25 billion 
18. Agent Orange on Trial, p. 214. See also: Veterans Speak Out on Agent Orange, NY Times, 
August 9, 1984.  
19. In Re Agent Orange Product Liability, 597 F. Supp. 740, 862 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). 
20. These features include the possibility of foreign citizens to file suites for human rights
abuses committed outside the United States; the class action mechanism; contingent fee arrangements; 
a legal culture in which lawyers are willing to take such cases upon themselves; recognition of 
jurisdiction over foreign defendants who conduct business in the United States; fixed and affordable 
court fees and an independent judiciary. Michael J. Bazyler, Holocaust Justice: The Battle for 
Restitution in America’s Courts, at xxii-xxiii (2003). 
21. See In re Nazi-Era Cases against German Defendants Litig., 198 F.R.D. 429 (D.N.J. 2000). 
22. Judge Korman, presiding over this case, was very much involved in the negotiations
leading to the settlement. Michael Bazyler writes: “The person most responsible for putting the deal 
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to be distributed according to a plan created by the court.23 Judge Korman 
held two fairness hearings, one in New York and the other in Israel. 
Following the fairness hearings, Judge Korman ordered some 
modifications to be made to the settlement and eventually approved it.24 I 
present an analysis of the hearing held on November 29, 1999, in 
Brooklyn, New York. About 200 people attended this hearing. Twenty-
six class members spoke before the court in a session that lasted the entire 
day. Seventeen lawyers also testified, four of whom were themselves 
Holocaust survivors. 
The third case, Raymond v. Rowland (referred to hereinafter as the 
Welfare Case), was a class action suit filed against the State Department 
of Social Services (DSS) in Connecticut. The suit was filed by a group of 
disabled recipients of various benefits and welfare programs (such as food 
stamps, Medicaid, and state administered general assistance) following 
the closing of one third of the social services offices in the state as part of 
re-organization and reduction processes. The claims, which were based 
on Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, alleged that there was 
not an adequate transition plan in place to deal with the office closings 
and that DSS failed to make the required accommodations to maintain 
accessibility of disabled persons to the benefits and services provided by 
the office.25 For example, many class members did not own a car nor 
could they use public transportation, and many had difficulties 
communicating by phone or mail. Also, the additional caseload of DSS 
workers (which was increased by 15%) resulted in workers not having 
enough time to properly handle the needs of recipients with disabilities. 
Plaintiffs sought an injunctive remedy—for the DSS to make 
institutional changes in order to provide nondiscriminatory service to the 
class members (estimated at more than 120,000 individuals with 
disabilities).26 The settlement itself, reached after two years of 
together was Judge Korman . . .  His successful efforts in both the settlement and the all-important 
implementation phase of the agreement have made him one of the champions of the Holocaust 
restitution movement.” See Bazyler, supra note 19, at 27-28. Judge Korman himself writes in his final 
decision that he “became intimately involved in the settlement discussions that led to an agreement.” 
In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 105 F.Supp.2d 139, 142 (E.D.N.Y. 2000). 
23. For a detailed review of the Holocaust Assets litigation, see Burt Neuborne, Preliminary 
Reflections on Aspects of Holocaust-Era Litigation in American Courts, 80 Wash. U. L.Q. 795 (2002). 
24. In Re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 311 F. Supp.2d 407 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).
25. Raymond v. Rowland, 220 F.R.D. 173, 175 (D. Conn. 2004). 
26. This lawsuit can be characterized as institutional reform litigation, seeking to bring on
systemic changes in the functioning of a large public organization. See generally Malcolm M. Feeley 
& Edward L. Rubin, Judicial Policy Making and the Modern State: How the Courts Reformed 
America’s Prisons (1998); Leonard Koerner, Institutional Reform Litigation, 53 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 
509 (2008).  
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negotiations,27 presented a series of changes to be made by DSS, 
including, for example, staff training in identifying disabilities and 
providing accommodations as needed and modifications to the DSS 
computer system and physical environment. A fairness hearing was held 
on September 10, 2007, in which 12 class members participated. Judge 
Kravitz of the District Court in New Haven, Connecticut, accepted the 
settlement directly following the hearing. 
B. Methodology 
This study presents an analysis of court transcripts. In analyzing this 
data, I use a unique methodology which incorporates interpretive reading 
with more structured methods of content analysis, which are based on 
systematic categorization and coding of the data. The methodology draws 
on critical discourse analysis and content analysis as well as on legal 
ethnography and, in particular, the ethnography of legal discourse.28 
Unlike traditional ethnography, this data was not collected through actual 
observation in the field.29 The source of the data is the official court 
transcripts, providing a word for word report of what was said at the 
hearings (naturally occurring talk).30 As presented in the transcripts, 
discourse is used as evidence of individuals’ perceptions of social 
interaction and social meaning. In this regard, my analysis follows the 
method of critical discourse analysis in its use of discourse as a source of 
evidence and as a way to better understand social phenomena. The work 
further reveals how “discourse in its first sense (language in use) also 
functions as discourse in its second sense (a form of social practice that 
‘constructs the objects of which it purports to speak’).”31 
27. Judge Kravitz indicated in the hearing: “it’s apparent from the docket sheet, that the Court 
itself while not involved in the settlement discussions, had numerous status conferences with the 
parties throughout that process, the parties could and did update the Court on progress.” Class counsel, 
Ms. Bergert replied saying that the Court’s close supervision over the process “was very helpful to 
keep negotiations going on track because they were rather intensive and difficult.” Hearing transcript, 
at 9. The docket sheet (on file with author) indeed indicates that numerous telephone status 
conferences were held and joint status reports were filed along the litigation process.  
28. See generally John M. Conley & William M. O’Barr, Rules Versus Relationships: The
Ethnography of Legal Discourse (1990). 
29. John M. Conley and William M. O’Barr, Legal Anthropology Comes Home: A Brief
History of the Ethnographic Study of Law, 27 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 41, 45 (1993).  
30. The research is also based on newspaper reports and accounts of people who attended the 
hearings as audiences and on interviews I held with special masters for the Agent Orange case (Ken 
Feinberg) and for the Holocaust Assets case (Burt Neuborne), who were present at the hearings and 
were involved in the management of the litigation. Court documents and decisions are additionally 
incorporated into the study. 
31. Deborah Cameron, Working with Spoken Discourse 123 (2001). 
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The main advantage in working with this sort of written account is 
that it enables a close examination of the content of individuals’ accounts, 
of the choices people make in speaking before the court, and of the verbal 
exchanges between participants. While this investigation lacks a first-
hand impression of the events, it excels in examining a clear and neutral 
representation of the hearings. 
The following analysis combines interpretive reading with 
systematic coding of the data. These different methods complement each 
other in what they reveal and in the kind of insight they yield.32 On the 
one hand, the in-depth reading of the transcripts yields insight into the 
nature of these events and the nature of different incidents that occur 
within them. Such a reading allows the researcher to be influenced 
(perhaps even moved) by the data, and thus a new dimension of 
understanding is introduced and incorporated into the study. 
On the other hand, the use of systematic categorization reveals 
phenomena within the text, frequencies, and relationships between 
different phenomena which would not be discovered through a qualitative, 
interpretive reading. And while categorization is helpful in organizing the 
data, “it also deflects attention away from uncategorized activities.”33 
Human behavior, individual’s accounts, or interactions often challenge 
this kind of categorization, so it is helpful to complete this type of analysis 
with a closer, interpretive reading. 
The unit of analysis for this study is the account of one speaker. The 
data set consists of a total of 156 units of analysis, representing 156 
speakers (97 in the Agent Orange case, 45 in the Holocaust Assets case 
and 14 in the Welfare Case). For each account I counted the number of 
words spoken by the speaker, the number of interactions with the judge, 
and the number of words spoken by the judge in the interaction with that 
speaker.34 I then created the set of categories according to which to 
analyze the materials. Based on the grounded theory approach, the 
creation of a categorization scheme was conducted while moving back 
and forth between theory and data, facing the challenge of translating the 
notion of meaningful participation, as explained above, into something 
that can be “measured” on the ground. 
32. On the use of mixed methods, see generally Sharlene Nagy Hesse-Biber, Mixed Methods 
Research: Merging Theory With Practice (2010).  
33. David Silverman, Interpreting Qualitative Data: Methods for Analysing Talk, Text and
Interaction 123 (2d ed. 2001).  
34. At this stage, interactions with the judge were not differentiated according to their length
or substance. The number of words uttered by the judge, however, was later used as an indication for 
the degree and quality of interaction. 
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A preliminary list of categories was formed based on the theoretical 
framework (examining lay participation around the themes of interaction, 
deliberation and expression) as well as on themes and phenomenon 
identified through preliminary readings of the transcripts. Based on this 
list, the transcripts of two of the hearings were read and categorized both 
by myself and by a co-reader. We then compared and discussed our 
results. This process achieved two goals: it helped refine the set of 
categories (removing ones that proved statistically insignificant and 
adding ones that were identified through the reading) and confirmed the 
reliability of the categories to create clear rules of inclusion for each one 
of them. At this stage I re-read and categorized the transcripts of all three 
hearings.35 Once the categorization and coding processes were completed, 
findings were classified through the counting of instances in each of the 
categories, and using statistical analysis, different comparisons were 
drawn: between lawyers and non-lawyers, between the three different 
cases, and between the different judges. 
The main categories used throughout the analysis include: 
• Type of speaker: litigants, class counsels (including defense
lawyers), and lawyers representing individual class
members. Depending on the question the two groups of
lawyers were sometimes consolidated.
• Opinion regarding approval of settlement: speakers were
either for or against the approval of settlement, and some did
not talk about the settlement at all (coded ND—not
discussed).
• Opinion on settlement itself: This category was added as it
became clear that speakers considered both whether the
settlement should be approved and the quality of settlement.
This category was coded as: favorable, ambivalent, neutral,
or not discussed.
• Boundaries—Formal and Substantive: referring to the
enactment and enforcement of boundaries of discourse and
rules of participation by the judge. I distinguish between
formal boundaries, relating mainly to the time allotted to
each speaker,36 and substantive boundaries, which relate to
the content of speech.
35. The process described here is referred to in grounded theory literature as ‘coding stage I,
II, and III.’ See Sally A. Hutchinson, Education and Grounded Theory, in Qualitative Research in 
Education: Focus and Methods 123(Robert R. Sherman & Rodman B. Webb, eds., 1988). 
36. The court would usually set a time limit of five or ten minutes per speaker, a practice that
is mentioned as appropriate in the Manual for Complex Litigation (Fourth) § 21.634 (2004). 
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• Reaction to boundaries: examining whether the speaker
complied with boundaries that were set by the judge.
• Judge-Speaker Interaction: Engagement over substantive
matters and acknowledgement of other person’s point of
view, and empathy of the judge towards speaker. Substantive 
issues are those concerning the merits of the case relating to
the settlement, to the process, etc. Empathy and
acknowledgement identify all instances in which a judge was 
responding to a speaker on a personal level acknowledging
feelings, personal circumstances, asking personal questions,
etc.37
In addition, the content of the speakers’ accounts was coded based 
on the following subjects: 
• Generating legitimacy for settlement;
• Relating to the importance of the opportunity to speak;
• Use of legal discourse or reasoning;
• Direct speech or appeal towards judge;
• Speaking about the group;
• Speaking about the “self” and about personal experiences;
• Speaking about the past;
• And discussion about what should happen in the future.
III. SETTING THE STAGE: STRUCTURE, RULES, AND BOUNDARIES
This Section discusses the procedural and substantive limits the 
judges established in each case for participation at the fairness hearing and 
the extent of enforcement of those limits.  
Once a settlement was reached in the Welfare Case, a notice was 
distributed among the class members. It read: “If You Have a Disability: 
Important Information about a Court Settlement.” The notice described 
the background of the case, described the settlement that had been 
reached, and explained in plain language the changes it would bring about 
within the DSS offices. It then went on to explain “how you can tell the 
Court if you object.” The notice continued: “The Court is holding a 
‘fairness hearing’ to consider whether the settlement agreement is fair, 
reasonable and adequate . . . . Class members do not have to attend the 
37. The rules of inclusion for this category were to a large degree provided by literature on
problem-solving or therapeutic approach to adjudication, which discusses specific ways to enhance 
personal skills of judges, in their attempt to create more meaningful, respectful and empathic 
connections with litigants. See, e.g., Susan Goldberg, Nat’l Judicial Inst., Can., Judging for the 21st 
Century: A Problem-Solving Approach (2005).  
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hearing, but may attend and comment on or object to the settlement 
agreement.” Having provided details for the hearing (time and place), the 
notice ended, in bold letters: “You do not have to go to the hearing or do 
anything else if you do not want to object to the settlement.”38 
Judge Kravitz started the hearing by mentioning the wide public 
interest in the case and the written comments he had received from class 
members in relation to the settlement. He then set the ground for the 
administration of the hearing: “I would like to hear from counsel for the 
parties in support, they filed a joint motion for approval of the 
settlement . . . but then I’m willing to listen to and take comments from 
others who may be interested in commenting on the settlement.”39 Judge 
Kravitz then introduced two limitations on the participation of class 
members. First, due to the large number of people who might wish to 
comment, he asked that the speakers limit themselves to three minutes 
each (a shorter time-frame in comparison to what was allowed in the two 
other hearings). And second, more substantially, the judge asked people 
to: 
. . .focus their comments on the settlement agreement itself and my 
inquiry at this point, which is a twofold inquiry, which is first to ensure 
that notice has been provided to class members, reasonable notice; and 
secondly, to make sure that the settlement agreement’s terms are fair and 
reasonable and adequate for the class members.40 
Judge Weinstein, presiding over the Agent Orange hearing, and 
Judge Korman at the Holocaust Assets hearing, did not define boundaries 
concerning the subject matter of the hearings or the content of 
participants’ accounts. Both judges stressed, however, the time limits, 
alongside the importance of hearing everyone who wanted to have an 
opportunity to be heard. Judge Weinstein, arriving at the San Francisco 
hearing after nine days of hearings in four different states, said: 
Good morning, everybody. It’s a great pleasure for me to be here in San 
Francisco, although not under the happiest of occasions. 
We have heard almost 400 witnesses up to now, and I have a list, which 
is growing rapidly, of those who wish to be heard in San Francisco. I’m 
going to try to hear everybody who wishes to be heard. I’m going to 
38. Citations are from the notice published by the court prior to the hearing (on file with
author).  
39. Transcript of Record at 3, Raymond v. Rowland, Fairness Hearing, September 10, 2007,
New Haven, Connecticut (file with author) [hereinafter Welfare hearing]. 
40. Id. at 3.
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work as late as possible tonight, if necessary. 
I’d like to ask you to limit your remarks to five minutes. . . . although I 
know some of you have been waiting for a long time to express your 
views on these matters and to ventilate some of your frustrations, we do 
want everybody to have an opportunity.41 
Judge Korman opened the Holocaust Assets hearing saying that it 
was “an honor and privilege for me to have participated in this case and 
to be here this morning to listen to you and hear your views about the 
settlement.” He then set the course of the hearing: “We’re going to first 
hear opening statements from counsel, and then I will listen to everyone 
who has signed up to speak. We’ll give everyone ten minutes. We’ll 
continue for as long as we can and if need be, we’ll continue tomorrow.”42 
It seems, then, that in this particular setting where most formal 
boundaries of participation are removed, the main limitation on 
participants was the time frame for each account. It should be noted, 
though, that while the Agent Orange and Holocaust Assets hearings took 
all day, the Welfare Case hearing lasted less than two hours. 
Once the rules of participation were set, it is interesting to examine 
the manner of their enforcement. We find throughout the hearings 25 
instances in which a judge asked a particular speaker to end his account 
because time had expired. Interestingly, although lawyers were speaking 
significantly more than litigants, in terms of words per speaker (see Table 
1), only 6 of these 25 instances were directed towards lawyers.43 
In the Holocaust Assets hearing there was practically no enforcement 
of time limits. In the Welfare Case hearing there was a single instance of 
enforcement of time limits. Additionally, after nine class members had 
testified and as others were waiting for their turn to speak Judge Kravitz 
said, “Hopefully we can begin to bring this to an end at some point.”44 It 
is interesting to see that while Judge Kravitz set the shortest time limit for 
each account, he was the judge with the largest number of interactions 
with participants (see Table 1, Table 7). 
Twenty-four of the time enforcement instances took place within the 
Agent Orange hearing (Table 7), perhaps because it was the hearing with 
the greatest number of speakers and lasted the longest. Additionally, and 
41. Transcript of Record at 4-5, In re Agent Orange Product Liability, Fairness Hearing, 
August 23 and 24, 1984, San Francisco (file with author) [hereinafter Agent Orange hearing]. 
42. Transcript of Record at 3, In re Holocaust Victims Asset Litigation, Fairness Hearing,
November 29, 1999, Brooklyn, New York(file with author) [hereinafter Holocaust Assets hearing].  
43. This ratio is not that significant if we consider the total number of lawyers speaking
compared with the number of litigants. 
44. Welfare hearing, supra note 39, at 47.
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this might be a result of the audience’s reactions in this hearing, the Agent 
Orange hearing was also the only one in which we find enforcement of 
other rules of participation. Throughout the hearing the crowd kept 
applauding different speakers. The first few times there was applause, the 
judge tried to stop them, “I know this is a highly emotional matter for 
many of you, but, please, this is a courtroom, not a public meeting.”45 But 
applause would often continue without further reaction from the court. 
Another example of Judge Weinstein’s need to address participant 
behavior was when a woman, who had already testified in the Chicago 
hearing, insisted on speaking again. The judge refused to allow it. “This 
is a courtroom. I will control my court,” Weinstein said repeatedly.46 
When the woman refused to sit down, the judge warned her that she would 
be held in contempt of court. 
Challenges concerning the relevancy of speakers’ accounts were 
very few. Overall, it seems that most of the speakers in all hearings could 
speak freely about any issue without being interrupted by the judge. As 
Judge Weinstein told a veteran who asked whether it would be permissible 
to read from a newspaper article during his account, “you can use your 
time anyway you wish.”47 This lack of enforcement regarding the subject 
matter of individuals’ accounts is not surprising given the broad and 
somewhat vague definition of what is “fair, reasonable, and adequate” 
from a legal perspective. Even though more than one-quarter of the 
speakers (41 speakers, table 2) did not disclose their personal stance vis-
à-vis the settlement, there were only a few instances in which speakers 
were directly asked by the judges to express their opinion. Only Judge 
Kravitz, in the middle of the Welfare Case hearing, asked speakers to 
comment “on the terms of the settlement agreement, if I could focus 
attention on that, the task that I have today is to decide whether this 
particular settlement agreement is a fair and reasonable one for the lawsuit 
that was brought.”48 
There were only seven instances of challenges to relevance—three 
in the Welfare Case hearing and four in the Agent Orange hearing. All of 
these challenges referred to speakers’ talking about topics beyond the 
scope of the case. For example, Judge Kravitz’s reply to a class member 
who was speaking about the question of the level of welfare benefits was, 
“Many individuals wrote to me about their concerns about overall levels 
of benefits, and I am certain that that is an important concern. This 
45. Agent Orange hearing, supra note 41, at 35. 
46. Id. at 167.
47. Id. at 276.
48. Welfare hearing, supra note 39, at 36-37. 
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particular lawsuit was not about that issue.”49 Another example is Judge 
Weinstein’s reply to an attorney who was speaking about a need for an 
injunctive relief to stop the use of dioxin. “That’s beyond the scope of this 
litigation. You know that as a lawyer. This is not a political statement. . . . 
That problem has to be addressed to the Congress and to other regulatory 
agencies. This is a court.”50 
None of the three judges ever raised the issue of relevance with 
regard to personal experiences and feelings. At times, though, it seems 
that a formal boundary was used to end a highly personal story, as the 
following example shows. “Class member: [. . .] The effect that it’s had 
on me has been devastating, in terms of in three years I probably made 
love three times to my wife. Court: Could you bring your statement to a 
conclusion?”51 
The lack of enforcement regarding the relevance of speech resulted 
in many accounts that were highly personal yet unrelated to the settlement. 
Such accounts might not facilitate the court’s mission of evaluating the 
settlement, but this expanding of the boundaries of relevant discourse is 
nonetheless revealing. It reveals the real concerns of the litigants,52 and 
how they interpret the case and the role of the court in adjudicating it. 
IV. THE FUNCTION OF THE HEARINGS I: DIALOGIC VERSUS
LEGITIMIZING EFFECT 
All three hearings had a similar structure: the first to speak were class 
counsel, who presented the settlement and arguments for its approval. 
Only then did the class members’ testimony begin along with the 
testimonies of lawyers who directly represented individual class 
members. 
At the Welfare Case hearing, both Ms. Bergert, class counsel, and 
Mr. Barber, representing the defendant, provided accounts that were 
aimed at defending the agreement itself as well as the process through 
which it had been achieved. Reading their accounts, it seems as though 
they were addressing two distinct audiences at the same time: the judge 
49. Id. at 46. 
50. Agent Orange hearing, at 376. 
51. Agent Orange hearing, at 311.
52. When litigants speak about details that are not legally relevant, it seems that they do so not 
because they do not care about legal relevancy, but because they have different, broader perceptions 
of what counts as legally relevant. Conley and O’Barr make a similar observation in their study of 
small claims court litigants. “The most significant practical question faced by informal court litigants” 
they write, “is whether their accounts will satisfy the court. The strategies that they employ in their 
efforts to meet this burden reflect their varied understandings of the law.” Conley & O’Barr, supra 
note 28, at 44. 
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and the class members. To the court, they focused on evaluating the 
settlement according to the legal factors for review of a settlement in a 
class action. To the public, they presented the original goals and scope of 
the lawsuit, and they highlighted the benefits of the settlement against the 
alternatives and consequences of not accepting it. The message to the 
audience was that the accomplishments of the settlement should be 
measured against the limited scope of the case and not against the broad 
range of failures and problems they had encountered with the DSS or 
difficulties faced by people with disabilities in general. Judge Kravitz 
himself conveyed a similar message in his closing statement, explaining 
his decision to approve the settlement: 
This agreement does not solve every problem that exists in the state or 
every problem that exists for disabled people or, indeed, every problem 
that exists in DSS as an agency. 
But this lawsuit was about accommodation and access . . . and I think 
everybody can be satisfied that this settlement is going to go a long way 
to enhancing that.53 
Put differently, attorneys, as well as the court, used the hearing to 
enhance the legitimacy of the settlement by introducing to the class 
members the realities of what can be achieved through this specific 
litigation. Another way of demonstrating the legitimacy of the settlement, 
demonstrated by the judge himself, was to highlight the efforts and 
credentials of the attorneys. The judge congratulated the lawyers on their 
work in this case on four different occasions throughout the hearing. 
The Holocaust Assets hearing also started with the testimony of class 
counsel. Their accounts were aimed mainly at the audience while 
defending the settlement in different ways. The first speaker, Mr. Ratner, 
emphasized the worldwide interest in the settlement and the widespread 
support therein. He provided figures indicating that very few comments 
and objections were received from members of the class.54 The second 
speaker, Mr. Swift, who literally turned his back to the judge in order to 
face the audience, also talked about the “overwhelming support for the 
settlement and the great good that this settlement can accomplish.”55 
Voicing a pragmatic approach, which characterized many of the accounts 
in this hearing, he concluded: “[h]ad we not settled this case, survivors 
and their heirs were in jeopardy of receiving nothing.”56 
53. Welfare hearing, supra note 39, at 56.
54. Holocaust Assets hearing, supra note 42, at 7.
55. Id. at 7.
56. Id. at 8-9.
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If in the Welfare Case hearing we saw how the court was 
complimenting the attorneys on both sides for their work, here we see 
class counsel and defense counsel complimenting themselves and each 
other. For example, leading class counsel Burt Neuborne related the 
requirement that there be arm’s-length adversarial bargaining, saying “I 
have bruises on my body that will demonstrate the arm’s-length and 
adversarial bargaining that went on in this case. We bargained for 18 
months, as vigorously as I have ever seen negotiations carried out.”57 Mr. 
Witten, the defense attorney, addressed the class members in the audience 
to say that “these lawyers . . . have given you a set of champions that could 
not be matched in any other courtroom, in any other case.”58 
The Agent Orange hearing in San Francisco began similarly with two 
attorneys from the plaintiffs’ management committee. Both of them talked 
directly to the veterans and provided a very detailed review of the legal 
questions brought up by the case and the difficulty to legally prove the 
veterans’ claims. Interestingly, Judge Weinstein interrupted both of them, 
asking them to end their statements so that the class members could be 
heard. The second speaker, class counsel Mr. Moyer, stated as follows: 
I come here today to spell out for the Court and for the veterans in 
particular who have gathered here, some of the real world 
considerations, the cold, hard facts which have led to this proposed 
settlement, and the realities, and based upon these realities to urge that 
this settlement be approved. 
[. . .] 
I think it is important that you, the veterans, understand the risks of our 
case, the risks both of the law and of the facts of the lawsuit which make 
this settlement the only rational course to follow.59 
There were shared themes in the accounts of class counsel in all the 
three hearings. They all used the hearing to generate legitimacy for the 
settlement among class members themselves. All three judges in these 
cases were considerably involved in the course leading towards the 
creation of the settlement agreements.60 Given such involvement on 
behalf of judges, it is not surprising that class counsel focused their efforts 
on convincing the class members themselves, rather than the judge, that 
the settlement was indeed fair and reasonable, and that it was in the best 
57. Id. at 35. 
58. Id. at 38. 
59. Agent Orange hearing, supra note 41, at 13-17.
60. See supra notes 17, 22, and 28 and accompanying discussion. 
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interest of the class that it be approved by the court. 
In a sense, and again given the involvement of judges in the creation 
of the settlements, the hearings could be thought of as taking place in a 
post-law state. It seems that on the eve of the approval of the settlement, 
all legal actors had given up on a trial and had given up in fact on 
adjudication in its traditional sense. It could be argued, therefore, that the 
fairness hearings make use of a participatory framework in order to 
legitimize controversial or unpopular outcomes. It could also be argued 
that by doing so, the hearings convey the actual lack of participation and 
lack of party control, which in fact characterizes the class action process.61 
Such sentiments are expressed, for example, in one Vietnam veteran’s 
description of the hearings in the Agent Orange case as a traveling 
circus.62 Or, to quote another speaker, the hearings were “a sleight of hand 
designed to convince veterans that they had a voice in the out-of-court 
settlement.”63 
Fairness hearings are mandated by law and judges must hold them. 
Yet judges do have a lot of discretion in deciding how to conduct the 
hearings. It seems clear that in the Agent Orange case, the need to 
legitimize a controversial settlement before the class played a role in 
Judge Weinstein’s decision to hold the hearings across the country. Ken 
Feinberg (who was special master in the case) mentioned in an interview 
several reasons leading to Weinstein’s decision, among them the notion 
that in such a case it would be appropriate to allow people the opportunity 
to unburden their hearts and participate. But there were also political 
reasons—seeing the hearing as a way of legitimizing the settlement before 
the class members (as well as before the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit). Additionally, according to Feinberg, Weinstein 
believed that by holding the hearings he would minimize the number of 
people who would opt out.64 
Another explanation for the decision to hold the hearings, and 
perhaps also for the manner in which they were held, is provided by Judge 
Weinstein himself. In an article he wrote ten years after the Agent Orange 
hearings, he stated as follows: 
61. This argument echoes a more general concern that a focus on procedural values might help 
authorities legitimatize decisions that are not substantially fair or just. See, for example, Bryant G. 
Garth & Austin Sarat, Justice and Power in Law and Society Research: On the Contested Careers of 
Core Concepts, in Justice and power in Sociolegal studies 1, 10 (Bryant G. Garth & Austin Sarat, 
eds., 1998).  
62. Gerald Nicosia, Home to War: A History of the Vietnam Veterans’ Movement 569 (2001) 
63. Fred A. Wilcox, Waiting for an Army to Die: The Tragedy of Agent Orange, at xx (1989). 
64. Interview with Ken Feinberg, New York, May 8, 2008. 
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Agent Orange presented similar problems [to asbestos litigation]. People 
were deeply affected—perhaps physically and certainly 
psychologically—by exposure to the chemical. Many of the veterans in 
the Agent Orange case chose not to marry, and when they did marry they 
chose not to have children, because they were concerned that their 
children would be afflicted. The medical evidence did not justify these 
fears. But it is fear, as much as medical evidence, that brings plaintiffs 
into courts; we must deal with perceptions as well as facts.65 
We should ask, therefore, whether these features of the hearings 
imply that a priori the hearings could have no real impact on the outcome? 
And furthermore, do they trump any possibility for a meaningful dialogue 
to develop throughout the hearings? In other words, we should ask 
ourselves whether dialogic and defensive (or legitimizing) features are 
exclusionary of each other. In order to address this question, one should 
take a closer look both at the opinions expressed in the hearings, their 
impact on the outcome, and their impact on the kind of dialogue that 
developed therein. 
While all three hearings eventually led to an approval of the 
settlement by the court, the three cases significantly varied with regard to 
participants’ opinions about the settlement. In the Holocaust Assets 
hearing, 35 speakers supported the approval of the settlement and 9 
speakers opposed it. In the Agent Orange hearing, only 16 speakers 
supported the settlement, 47 opposed it and 34 did not disclose an opinion 
regarding approval of the settlement. Finally, in the Welfare Case hearing, 
7 speakers supported the settlement, 1 opposed it and 6 speakers (almost 
half the participants) did not disclose their opinion. (See table 2, figures 
include lawyers and litigants). Only in the Agent Orange hearing, 
therefore, was there actually a significant amount of opposition to the 
settlement voiced throughout the hearing. 
When we distinguish between the question of whether a speaker was 
for or against the approval of settlement and the separate question of his 
or her opinion of the settlement itself, we reveal that participants’ attitudes 
towards the settlement were more complex than simply being for or 
against it. There was often a discrepancy between the participants’ view 
of the settlement and their ultimate opinion whether to support or oppose 
it. Approximately one third of the speakers in all hearings (50 speakers, 
table 3) were ambivalent in their evaluation of the settlement. Only 25 of 
the speakers who supported the approval of settlement (examined in all 
65. Jack B. Weinstein, An Introduction to Who’s Who in Mass Toxic Torts, 80 Cornell L. Rev.
845, 846 (1995).  
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cases) were also favorable towards the settlement. Another 25 speakers 
who supported the settlement were actually ambivalent in their evaluation 
of it. Ambivalence was less common among those who opposed the 
settlement (11), and those who did not disclose an opinion of it (14). This 
reveals a complexity in individuals’ opinions, which transcends the need 
for a decisive binary outcome at the end of the hearing. Whether a 
settlement had to be approved or disapproved and whether it was fair or 
just, were viewed as separate issues altogether. 
A prototypical manifestation of this complexity would be the 
pragmatic approach that typified the opinions of many of the speakers at 
the Holocaust Assets hearing. Across the board, every speaker—lawyer 
or litigant—who supported the Holocaust Assets settlement explained it 
in pragmatic terms. They acknowledged the fact that the settlement was 
not perfect, rather far from it, and that it could not be viewed as fair. “[S]o 
this is not a fair deal, considering for how many people they did it,”66 or 
just “[W]e certainly cannot ask at this point for justice.”67 But despite 
these reservations, the settlement was to be accepted for practical reasons, 
mainly because of the condition of many of the survivors who were mostly 
elderly and poor, and delay was not in their best interest.68 The notion that 
was shared by a great number of speakers was that the settlement was to 
be approved because this was the most that reality and the law could offer 
them: 
The words fair, just, reasonable, equitable have no real meaning when 
applied to the Holocaust. There needs to be a new terminology, a new 
set of words, a new definition that could adequately comport to what the 
Holocaust means to our time and to the history of mankind. But until 
that is created, having to live with the terminology that exists, we 
endorse this proposal as being real, even if it is not the ideal.69 
Going back to the question of the impact of participation on the 
outcomes of the cases, manifestations of the complexity of participants’ 
views could be meaningful, because while judges were to decide whether 
or not to approve a given settlement, they could also order its 
modification. In this respect, opinions and views of speakers could have 
66. Holocaust Assets hearing, supra note 42, at 119. 
67. Id. at 108. 
68. The practical concerns were real and acute. “By the time the first payments went out in late 
2001, many of the survivors who joyously hailed the settlement in mid-1998 had died while waiting 
for their check. Others just gave up, exasperated not only by the numerous delays but also with the 
complicated forms they were made to fill out in order to receive the settlement proceeds.” Bazyler, 
supra note 20, at 30.  
69. Holocaust Assets hearing, supra note 42, at 59-60.
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been incorporated into the settlement by having it amended. This was 
done, though, only in the Holocaust Assets case, where we actually find 
the one single clear indication of a fairness hearing having a direct impact 
on the final outcome of the case with regard to the question of the rights 
of owners of looted works of art.70 
There was one other example throughout the hearings of a hearing 
having a practical impact on the litigation process: towards the middle of 
the second day of the Agent Orange hearing, and after many speakers had 
complained that members of the class were not properly informed of the 
case and of the settlement or of their own rights with regard to the 
settlement, Judge Weinstein announced that he would postpone the 
deadline for filing the forms to be included in the settlement, a statement 
which elicited applause from the audience.71 
Occurrences of a direct impact of the hearing were certainly 
infrequent. At the same time, these two examples provide an important 
demonstration of the actual, as well as potential, benefit of the public 
hearing. These examples show how the participation of class members can 
help in bringing before the court new information that was not before it 
prior to the hearing and new information that members of the class have 
better access to. Participation also helped in raising issues that were 
overlooked by the negotiating attorneys who created the settlement. 
If meaningful participation is to be assessed solely according to its 
actual impact on the outcome, then the findings presented here are limited. 
If we examine meaningful participation, however, according to levels of 
interaction and dialogue with the decision maker, the data reveals 
interesting insights. The degree of meaningful interaction with the judge 
was assessed using three different criteria: the number of words spoken 
by the judge towards the speaker, engagements over substantive matters, 
and acknowledgments of other persons’ points of views (OPOV). 
Examining the impact of speakers’ attitudes towards the settlement 
on the judges’ reactions (table 9), we see that judges spoke significantly 
70. During the hearing, several lawyers brought up concerns regarding claims for looted works 
of art still kept in Switzerland, claiming that the settlement, unintentionally, deprived the legal rights 
of the rightful owners of these works of art. For example, see accounts of Mr. Goldstein and Ms. 
Weber, who represented a European body dealing with all matters relating Nazi looted art and cultural 
property. Holocaust Assets hearing, at 66-82. During the hearing, judge Korman discussed this matter 
with the lawyers and promised to consider it seriously. Hearing transcript at 81. Following the hearing, 
at the order of the court, the parties amended the settlement in order to address this problem. The 
modifications that were made to the original settlement in that regard (and other modifications as 
well) are stated in an amendment to the settlement, which can be found at: 
http://swissbankclaims.com/Documents/DOC_20_Amendment2.pdf 
71. Agent Orange hearing, supra note 41, at 317. 
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more with speakers who were against the settlement than with speakers 
who were for the settlement (83 words versus 27 words). Judges mostly 
spoke with those who had not disclosed their opinion on the settlement 
(92 words). In addition, there were significantly more acknowledgments 
of OPOV towards those who were against the settlement or did not 
disclose their opinion. Discussions over substantive matters were similar 
with speakers who were for or against the settlement, yet significantly 
higher with speakers who did not disclose their opinion. One might 
conclude that those in favor of the settlement required less attention from 
the judge. It could further be deduced that judges did not shy away from 
disagreement with speakers. Considering the fact that the opinions of 
those who opposed the settlement were never actually accepted, it is 
nevertheless meaningful to recognize that these speakers had the 
opportunity to engage in conversation with the decision maker over their 
views. 
V. THE FUNCTION OF THE HEARINGS II: THE RELATIONAL EFFECTS 
The three hearings significantly differ with respect to the degree of 
interaction between judges and participants (tables 1, 7). Judge Korman, 
at the Holocaust Assets hearing, did not say much throughout the day and 
had but a few interactions with speakers. He engaged in conversation with 
class members only where clarifications were necessary and spoke with 
some of the attorneys who brought up objections to the settlement. The 
few interactions Judge Korman did have were engagements over 
substantive matters, whereas he had almost no expressions of OPOV 
(table 7). The two other judges, however, were much more dominant 
throughout the hearing, often conversing with speakers and demonstrating 
in general a high degree of involvement and responsiveness to litigants’ 
accounts. 
At the Welfare Case hearing, Judge Kravitz was highly attentive to 
the personal narratives: when a speaker recounted a recent improvement 
in her condition, the judge responded by saying that it was “very very 
good to hear.”72 Likewise, when another speaker concluded her remarks 
declaring, “I am a disabled American and I have not received any 
acknowledgement,” the judge answered: “Let’s see if we can get you 
some acknowledgement then.”73 Judge Kravitz repeatedly affirmed that 
the concerns brought up by the speakers were very important (even if not 
always within the scope of the case), and would engage with the speakers’ 
72. Welfare hearing, supra note 39, at 29.
73. Id.at 36. 
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accounts by saying “right” every once in a while.74 The judge also made 
a point to thank the speakers for taking the time to come speak with him, 
to write to him, and to comment about the case. Moreover, throughout the 
hearing, Judge Kravitz tried to provide practical solutions to the specific 
needs of the speakers. Whenever a speaker would mention a personal 
condition requiring assistance from the DSS office or another authority, 
the judge would urge the speaker to turn to the plaintiffs’ lawyers, 
explaining that they agreed to meet with individuals, hear their 
complaints, and see if they “can assist in any way and help with the 
processing.”75 He urged the DSS representative to use the jury room to 
meet with those who needed personal advice: “they don’t need to meet in 
the hallway – with some privacy.”76 
Reading the court transcripts provides the impression that the court 
itself has become an extension of the DSS office. So much so that when 
one woman told the judge “I hope you will make sure that somebody does 
get back to me,” the judge had to reaffirm his role explaining that “I can’t 
sort of go out and get lawyers and tell them to go find you, okay? I’m 
supposed to [be] an independent impartial decision maker. What I have 
asked of both sides was [. . .] to make themselves available, to listen to 
any complaints that people have.”77 
Judge Weinstein, at the Agent Orange hearing, was similarly highly 
dominant and interactive throughout the hearing. Given the strong level 
of opposition to the settlement and the highly emotional nature of many 
of the accounts in that hearing, it is interesting to examine how the judge 
dealt with the pain, needs, and hopes of the veterans, when these were 
addressed directly to him. It is interesting to observe the strategies 
employed by the judge when he was confronted with demands and hopes 
that were beyond his professional capacity. Weinstein’s involvement in 
the formation of the settlement renders the interaction between him and 
the numerous class members who opposed the settlement all the more 
interesting. Weinstein could, of course, let the veterans speak up and just 
listen, but he chose in many instances during the hearing to engage, 
communicate, and confront their accounts. 
For one thing, Judge Weinstein was very clear and open about the 
limits and limitations of the law. He kept explaining that many of the 
74. Conley and O’Barr observe that in the informal courts they studied judges seldom provided 
any cues, such as “yes”, or “I see”, while witnesses were speaking, which leaves witnesses without 
guidance as to how long to continue their account. Conley & O’Barr, supra note 28, at 42. 
75. Welfare hearing, supra note 39, at 27.
76. Id. at 26. 
77. Id. at 41-42. 
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veterans’ concerns and demands were beyond what could be achieved in 
this lawsuit. “This court is very limited in what it can do,” Weinstein said, 
“It’s a court of law. It can only handle a specific litigation.”78 Facing the 
objections regarding the level of participation by veterans, Weinstein 
openly admitted: “You understand as well as I that the class action is 
basically one that denies many aspects of due process [. . .] The class 
action is basically an undemocratic way of deciding practical litigation.”79 
While he was willing to listen to legally irrelevant accounts, 
Weinstein did stress that his decision would be based on the legal merits 
and according to the demands of the law. He spoke clearly and openly in 
relation to the court’s capabilities and limitations and was equally honest 
about what he himself would and would not do in making the decision: 
I am here to decide in accordance with the law and the facts as I have 
stated it, and I may make a mistake, I am only human. But I will do the 
best I can in a decision, but I will not promise you anything. You go 
away from this courtroom with no promises and anyone who is in here 
who thinks I promised them anything should get that clear.80 
Finally, he stated unequivocally that he was not able to solve all of 
the veterans’ problems.81 But he did offer them something else in return. 
Judge Weinstein flew across the country to meet with the veterans (a 
fact that did not go unnoticed by the veterans, as one of them said “it 
certain meant a lot to me to know that someone could care enough to come 
3,000 miles to hear my two or three minutes worth”82); he would sit as 
long as it would take to provide each of them with an opportunity to be 
heard. He expressed respect to the veterans and their experiences: “I must 
say that it’s a great privilege to have had this opportunity to meet all these 
people.”83 He acknowledged their suffering: “I know that you have been 
through a very, very difficult period following the excruciating years that 
you’ve had,” he said to one veteran’s wife.84 The judge was utterly 
engaged in their personal accounts: he listened and seemed truly interested 
in what they had to say. Francis Hamit wrote about the hearing in Chicago: 
Throughout the day, Judge Weinstein remained calm, attentive, and 
kindly. He was always interested, and never came down on a speaker. 
Some of the speakers were souls in torment who had never said anything 
78. Agent Orange hearing, supra note 41, at 256. 
79. Id. at 130. 
80. Id. at 117.
81. Id. at 149.
82. Id. at 208. 
83. Id. at 144. 
84. Id. at 109-110. 
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about the war to anyone. Weinstein could have dismissed such 
meanderings as not germane to the issues. He did not. He reacted with 
compassion.85 
At the end of the day, though, the judge decided to approve the 
settlement even though the majority of speakers were against it (in view 
of the size of the class, it was still easy to dismiss those speaking at the 
hearings as not representing the majority of ‘silent’ veterans who 
presumably supported the settlement). Was compassion enough, then, to 
make up for that final decision? Did Weinstein’s relational approach have 
any positive impact on participants? Further research is required to 
empirically address these questions and the post-litigation perceptions of 
litigants. Anecdotally, we saw that some veterans thought that the 
hearings were a fixed game, while others were certainly touched by what 
they deemed as the court’s willingness to listen: “I thank you, for just 
being able to be here and hear all this testimony,86 and to help.” And, 
another stated, “I’m glad, your Honor, to know that your court is trying to 
gain some help for the suffering.”87 
Comparing the accounts of litigants in the three hearings based on 
their content (table 6) suggests that litigants in the Agent Orange hearing 
provided relatively more personal accounts, yet, the findings cannot 
indicate whether this was in any way a result of the Judge’s conduct. 
Furthermore, comparing the three hearings, the study does not show 
a positive correlation between the degree of interaction between 
participants and the decision maker and the degree of legal effectiveness 
of participation. Judge Korman, in the Holocaust Assets case, who was 
the least interactive of the three judges, was nonetheless the most 
responsive and open to objections and to the consequent amendment of 
the settlement accordingly. 
VI. DELIBERATION: BY WHOM AND OVER WHAT? COMPARING THE
ROLES OF LAWYERS AND LAY PARTICIPANTS 
The fairness hearing provides an opportunity for direct participation 
of lay litigants. At the same time, lawyers do play a significant role in 
these hearings. In this study, 33 out of 156 speakers were lawyers. 
Furthermore, lawyers were found to provide significantly longer accounts 
than did litigants, and to have more interactions with the court (table 1). 
Judges engaged more with lawyers when it came to substantive matters 
85. Francis Hamit, Blood Money: the Agent Orange Settlement Fairness Hearings 10 (1984).
86. Agent Orange hearing, supra note 41, at 219. 
87. Id. at 78. 
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yet showed more acknowledgment of OPOV towards litigants (table 8). 
This finding raises questions as to the roles that different types of 
participants played in the hearing and the importance of lay participation 
therein. 
Comparing the accounts of lawyers and litigants along the features 
categorized in the data (tables 4 and 5), yields mixed results. Quite 
surprisingly, we find that the frequency of all of the following features 
was similar regarding both lawyers and litigants: using direct speech 
towards the judge, being ambivalent about the settlement, speaking about 
the group, about the future and about the importance of voice. Significant 
differences were found, however, with respect to use of legal discourse 
(only 7% of litigants and 73% of lawyers); generating legitimacy for 
settlement (only 4% of litigants, and 33% of lawyers); speaking about the 
past (97% of litigants and 85% of lawyers) and speaking about oneself, 
which was found in 89% of litigants’ accounts and only 45% of lawyers’ 
accounts. A close reading of the transcripts reveals further differences 
with respect to participants’ approaches, perceptions, and understandings 
of the questions at the heart of the hearing. It also reveals significant 
differences between the accounts of class counsel to those of lawyers who 
were directly representing litigants. Examining and comparing 
participants along the lay versus professional axis is not enough, therefore, 
and one should further distinguish the roles of class counsel and other 
attorneys. 
Starting with the Welfare Case hearing, it is clear from the transcript 
that this hearing was not a grand social or public event, especially 
compared with the Agent Orange or the Holocaust Assets hearings. The 
Welfare Case did not generate the same public attention and did not carry 
the same kind of historical disposition as the two other cases. The hearing 
seems to lack the drama or high emotions that characterized the hearings 
in these two other cases. This is not to say, of course, that the speakers did 
not raise significant and emotional issues, nor does it mean that the 
concerns brought up in this hearing did not have public consequences. 
Some speakers talked about their own personal problems and experiences, 
ones that are also relevant to other individuals living with disabilities. 
Others made general claims about the way people with disabilities are 
treated in American society. They spoke also of discrimination and 
justice. And yet, the event did not seem to transcend the personal 
dimension of the problems at hand. 
Perhaps it was the relatively small number of participants, only 
twelve speakers, or the fact that many of them presented a solely personal 
account, rather than group-oriented or general accounts (only 67% of 
28
Akron Law Review, Vol. 52 [2019], Iss. 4, Art. 4
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol52/iss4/4
2018] THE CASE OF THE FAIRNESS HEARING 1133 
speakers related to the group in their accounts, compared with 94% of the 
speakers in the Agent Orange hearing). It could also be the pragmatic, 
problem-solving approach that seems to have characterized this litigation 
all along. People came to the court to speak about their problems, about 
the great difficulties in living with disabilities, about the inaccessibility of 
the Social Service offices and the mistreatment by its workers. Notably, 
the one factor that was hardly ever mentioned throughout the hearing was 
the law. 
Speakers in this hearing can be described along a scale according to 
how personal or general their accounts were. Personal stories told in the 
hearing included, for example, that of Mr. Rivera, whose papers 
constantly got lost by the DSS office;88 the account of Mr. McLaughlin, 
suffering from psychiatric illness, who complained about the benefits that 
were insufficient to make ends meet;89 and that of Ms. Corso, a sixty year 
old woman who spoke about her difficulties in finding a job, to name a 
few.90 
The more general or group-oriented accounts were also diverse; 
some being more related to the legal matter at hand than others. By general 
and group-oriented accounts I refer to statements that related to issues, 
demands, or concerns that went beyond the personal condition of the 
speaker—issues concerning disabled persons or the welfare system more 
generally. A clear example would be that of Ms. Goldshin, the 
representative of a veterans’ group, who asked the court “to address to the 
State that they cannot continue to retaliate against disabled people.”91 But 
class members speaking on their own behalf were also making general 
claims: from the history of the welfare system92 through general claims 
regarding discrimination93 and accessibility94 to arguments concerning 
the level of benefits and even a call for civil disobedience.95 One example 
is the account of Ms. Albert. Her following words are very personal, but 
they echo deep concerns regarding the welfare system: 
A lot of changes need to happen because the Americans with Disabilities 
Act passed in 1990 . . . and it’s like, hello, human being here. . . . I am a 
human being, deserving of dignity, humanity and respect. I deserve trust 
88. Welfare hearing, supra note 39, at 30.
89. Id. at 45. 
90. Id. at 36-37. 
91. Id. at 33. 
92. Id .at 39. 
93. Id. at 44. 
94. Id. at 47. 
95. Id. at 46. 
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in helping agencies run by this agency as every human being. 
My experiences with DSS has been frustrating, full of anxiety, and anger 
provoking. It’s also been debilitating, a.k.a. disabling, revictimizing, and 
restigmitizing. 
Thank you very much for listening.96 
In the Welfare Case hearing, one could compare lawyers and class 
members as two distinct groups; whereas, in the Holocaust Assets hearing 
it is important to acknowledge the existence of different sub-groups of 
participants. With regard to the attorneys in the Holocaust Assets hearing, 
there was a clear distinction between class counsel, who were all 
supporting the settlement and using the settlement to promote its 
legitimacy, and those attorneys directly and independently representing 
class members or groups of class members, who presented various views 
regarding the settlement. 
As for class members themselves, we should note that the Holocaust 
Assets class itself was comprised of many different sub-groups with 
varying interests. In the hearing, there were litigants representing 
organizations which were involved in the settlement process and were 
mostly supportive of it. There were speakers representing different 
survivors’ groups, a speaker who represented the Association of Roma in 
Poland, speakers from Israel, and speakers from Europe. Some speakers 
had accounts in Swiss banks or were the heirs of individuals who had such 
accounts, while others did not. Some were children during the Holocaust, 
and others were children of Holocaust survivors born after the war. It is 
only natural in such an immense class action and within such a diverse 
class to have diverse views and feelings among class members regarding 
the settlement or the lawsuit itself. This was apparent in all hearings 
examined here, but the Holocaust Assets hearing was the only one in 
which we find clear conflicts emerging among class members themselves. 
This was apparent with respect to the question of distribution, as it was 
with respect to the question of participation of Jewish organizations in the 
management of the case. 
Keeping in mind the above-mentioned caveat concerning sub-groups 
within the group of lawyers and that of class members, there is still a lot 
to be learned from examining, side by side, the accounts of lawyers and 
class members. The two groups brought into the hearing entirely different 
types of issues and accounts. Lawyers speaking at the hearing did 
acknowledge in some ways the non-legal (e.g., historical and moral) 
96. Id. at 50-53. 
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implications and meanings of the case, but they mostly tried to concentrate 
on the legal ones. As Burt Neuborne observed, “[A] negotiated settlement 
was the best possible way to deal with what is after all a lawsuit, not a 
moral question. The moral question is going to be dealt with outside of 
this courtroom. We did the best we could, dealing with the legal claims.”97 
It was evident to all participants in the hearing—lawyers and non-lawyers 
alike—that the moral questions concerning the alleged wrongs on the part 
of the Swiss banks during the Holocaust could not be answered through a 
monetary settlement. Yet lawyers seemed to accept this dichotomy— 
between law and morality, or law and justice—as a working premise and 
focused on doing their best dealing with the legal questions. Class 
members, on the other hand, did not limit themselves to the legal 
questions, and many actually used the hearing in order to voice the very 
same issues that were beyond the legal scope of the case. It was clear that 
class members related to the case in broader terms and ascribed to it a 
variety of meanings and goals. In fact, many non-lawyer speakers 
experienced discomfort with the legal terminology used by the lawyers 
with regard to the settlement. Class members resisted the use of the terms 
“fair, reasonable, and adequate,” used by attorneys following the language 
of Rule 23. A similar resistance was raised also with respect to the term 
“closure,” mentioned a few times by the defense attorney, who repeatedly 
stated that the settlement “brings about complete closure” to the issues 
raised by the lawsuit.98 In response, Mr. Rechter, who was in favor of the 
settlement, said: 
It hurt me this morning very much when one attorney after another was 
talking about fair, reasonable and adequate. Fair, reasonable and 
adequate? And the Swiss lawyer was telling us complete closure. You 
want complete closure? Bring me back my father, bring me back my 
uncle, bring me back my whole family in Poland. . . . This is a 
settlement, but by all means, don’t call it fair or adequate. It can never 
be complete closure.99 
Many speakers chose to present their own personal history as 
Holocaust survivors or descendants of Holocaust survivors. They spoke 
about the ghettos and concentration camps, about survival, and about 
those who had perished. Reading the transcripts, one would find moving 
97. Holocaust Assets hearing, supra note 42, at 33. 
98. Id. at 49. 
99. Id. at 101-102. The headline of the New York Times report on the hearing echoes Mr.
Rechter’s words as well. The reporter writes: “An American lawyer for the Swiss banks hit a nerve 
when he used the overworked word ‘closure’ to describe the settlement.” See Clyde Haberman, Maybe 
a Settlement, Never Closure, N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1999, B1.  
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personal accounts, very detailed at times, describing what had happened 
to the speakers and their families during and after the war. Speakers 
depicted the different concentration camps where they were imprisoned, 
the last time they saw their parents, and how they themselves were saved. 
Some were speaking about their lives before the war. Overall, the section 
of the hearing devoted to class members’ accounts could be described as 
highly personal and emotional. 
Monetary issues frequently came up during the hearing, such as the 
adequacy of the sum settled upon or the right way to distribute the money. 
Yet at the same time, many speakers emphasized that the case was not 
only about the money. One speaker described the sufferings of the 
victims, saying, “It is impossible to estimate it in monetary form.”100 
Another speaker resented the mere attempt to treat these events in 
monetary terms: “We don’t see how we could agree that somebody could 
buy off and say, we give you so much and forget about it and no claims, 
nothing, nothing happened. We [are] erasing the Holocaust.”101 A pro-
bono attorney representing a group of seventy survivors argued, “A lot of 
what this case is about is not just the money; it’s trying to restore 
individual dignity to survivors. . .”102 Others saw the lawsuit as restoring 
historical justice: “For me, as a Holocaust survivor, what we are doing 
here, it is not a question of money. It’s a question that history had proven 
right now that Switzerland will no longer be known as a country of cuckoo 
clocks, skiing and neutrality.”103 
Another speaker mentioned the therapeutic benefit of the case, which 
“brought survivors together to speak with one another, give each other 
support, which I think has been remarkably cathartic.”104 In that respect it 
was not only the lawsuit in itself that was significant. Some participants 
talked specifically about the fairness hearing as serving important 
historical and moral purposes. One speaker said, “I’m sure today’s hearing 
will be entered in the history of jurisprudence. I, as a Second World War 
veteran, listening to these speeches today, felt like I’m listening to the 
Nuremberg process all over again.” 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that the hearing did not serve 
only symbolic or historical purposes. Many speakers took advantage of 
the opportunity to directly address the court in order to present practical 
difficulties, concerns, and questions regarding the litigation process. One 
100.  at 128. 
101.   at 137. 
102.  at 163. 
103.  at 21-22.  
104.  Id. at 167. 
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speaker complained that the questionnaires sent to class members were 
too long and too complicated, which was why many potential class 
members did not even bother filling them out and sending them back.105 
Another class member complained about the level to which the class 
members were actually involved in the negotiations over the settlement, 
expressing the importance of voice: “During the war, we had no voice 
over what was happening to ourselves. Now we have amongst us, as you 
know, doctors, professors, chairs of Holocaust studies. . . and we think 
that the Holocaust survivors should have been involved far more in all the 
negotiations than they actually were.”106 
Many speakers related to the question of distribution, although 
legally the court was to determine the allocation of the funds only after 
the approval of the settlement. For class members, this order of things did 
not seem reasonable. The way by which the fund was going to be allocated 
seemed inseparable from the question of whether they should support the 
settlement, as well as from the question of whether it was in fact a fair and 
adequate one. How can individuals actually form an opinion on a 
settlement without knowing what the level of the compensation might be? 
“A billion sounds very high, very, very much to me, who lives today in 
Boston, in subsidized housing,” said Ms. Beer, one of the first to bring up 
claims against the Swiss. “But how is it going to be distributed? Who is 
going to think about the human beings who are here, who have been 
fighting for years?”107 
Other than distribution, another question that seemed to occupy 
many of the speakers was the question of legal fees, which were also to 
be determined only after the approval of the settlement. Many lawyers 
were working pro-bono, but there were a few who asked to be paid for 
their work. This generated strong reactions from class members, and many 
speakers did not think it was appropriate for attorneys to ask for legal fees 
in such a case—especially not the high fees they had demanded.108 
Concerns regarding lawyers and their role were sometimes deeper than 
the monetary question and related to the very ability of lawyers to 
understand, and moreover, represent the class members’ causes. One 
example is the Holocaust survivor who said in the hearing, “There are 
many lawyers who were never exposed to life in concentration camps, but 
105.  Id. at 23.  
106.  Id. at 105. 
107.  Id. at 54.  
108.  This question actually continued to generate controversy long after the settlement was 
approved. See Menachem Z. Rosensaft, Profiting from the Holocaust, L.A. Times, Nov. 19, 2006; 
Burt Neuborne, What Profit? I Gave up $10 Million, L.A. Times, Nov. 19, 2006.  
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they write briefs about it. They are very eager to represent us and to make 
millions of dollars in the process. This cannot happen. This must not 
happen.”109 
The Agent Orange hearing presented the highest rate of opposition 
towards the settlement. The disappointment many veterans felt when the 
settlement was announced and the tension between veterans’ hopes from 
the litigation and its actual resolution were bound to manifest themselves 
in the hearing. Many of the Vietnam veterans expressed their sense of 
anger and pain. They relived the experience of being betrayed by their 
country. It is hard to summarize—or even select from the many 
testimonies heard during these two days—stories about physical illness, 
emotional distress, mistreatment by the Veterans Administration, ruined 
marriages, miscarriages, and disabled children. Veterans did not shy away 
even from the most personal and painful of details. More than a few 
speakers broke into tears. 
Despite the varied testimony, it is nevertheless possible to identify 
several repeating themes and concerns. Some of these themes were similar 
to those described in the Holocaust Assets hearing above: differences 
between attorneys from the management committee and attorneys who 
represented individual class members, or the dissatisfaction of class 
members with the management committee and the sense that there was 
not enough participation and involvement on the part of class members 
both in managing the case and in negotiating the settlement. 
There were many different reasons provided by veterans for their 
opposition to the settlement: some of the reasons had to do with the terms 
of that specific settlement, others had to do with the veterans’ wish to have 
the case litigated to its end and to have their day in court. Some veterans 
thought there was not enough research-based data about Agent Orange to 
allow for an informed resolution of the lawsuit. One veteran stated that “if 
studies are unfinished and open-ended I feel it foolish to finalize a 
settlement of this magnitude.”110 Others referred to the injustice inherent 
in the terms of the settlement, pursuant to which not all veterans would 
end up being compensated. “Is it also fair that not every person suffering 
from dioxin poisoning will be compensated? Who is going to be the 
person that is not compensated? Why will he be chosen and who is going 
to tell him why?”111 Many also thought that the sum of $180 million was 
not high enough in view of the size of the class and the severe damages 
109.  Holocaust Assets hearing, supra note 41, at 24. 
110.  Agent Orange hearing, supra note 40, at 356.  
111.  Id. at 29.  
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suffered by many of them.112 Others opposed the mere notion that their 
suffering could be translated into monetary terms. One veteran, Mr. 
Kalama, said, “On the question of whether the fund is fair, reasonable, 
how do you put a monetary value on the miscarriage of a child that you 
will never be able to hold and love or a marriage that has fallen apart?”113 
While some veterans raised concerns regarding the specific terms of 
the settlement, many others said that they would have opposed any 
settlement. Like Mr. Taylor who said, “It’s my personal opinion, your 
Honor, if you were to award me the whole $180,000,000 personally, I 
would not accept it. I want to see the Vietnam veterans in this country to 
get their day in court, to get their chance for justice.”114 Veterans and their 
attorneys kept repeating their request that the case go to trial, that they 
have their day-in-court: “We would like to have our day in court, I believe, 
and we know we run the risk of losing the whole show, but we would like 
our day in court. Thank you.”115 
Vietnam veterans, like other tort litigants, sought many things from 
the lawsuit other than monetary compensation. They wanted recognition 
of their sufferings; they demanded the truth about Agent Orange; they 
wished the government would take responsibility and even ask for their 
forgiveness; they wanted revenge and justice; and they wanted their 
outcry to be heard. No settlement could meet those needs. “We don’t 
know,” a veterans’ organizer said is what veterans tell him when he asks 
why they oppose the settlement, “we don’t know, and now we’ll never 
know the answers.”116 Another veteran said, “I felt great about the 
settlement . . . until I realized that the proof isn’t there. I cannot be a whole 
man today unless I have that proof. I don’t want a damned dime if my 
little girl dies.”117 And another veteran stated: “The issue is not adequacy 
of settlement. The issue is, and always has been, whether Agent Orange 
causes birth defects, skin diseases or any type of internal disorders and 
 112.  Indeed, once the settlement was approved most veterans did not receive any compensation, 
and the ones suffering the most serious conditions received very low compensations. The distribution 
of the fund was made through two separate programs. The first was a payment program that provided 
cash directly to veterans who were totally disabled or to survivors of deceased veterans (averaging 
about $3,800). The second program was a class assistant program, which provided money to veterans 
through social services organizations. $74 millions were distributed through that program to over 80 
organizations working with veterans. The fund closed on September 1997, having exhausted all its 
assets.  
113.  Agent Orange hearing, supra note 40, at 53. 
114.  Id. at 91-92.  
115.  Id. at 155.  
116.  Id. at 95.  
117.  Id. at 236.  
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cancer.”118 
It seems that many veterans had no faith in the attorneys on the 
plaintiffs’ management committee. Veterans’ dissatisfaction with their 
legal representation was closely related to their desire to be more involved 
in the litigation and to have more control over decisions that had to do 
with their lives. Veterans felt that “they have lost their voice” in the 
settlement process, and that the hearing was the “only opportunity to 
express our views.”119 Indeed, the hearing itself was deemed and 
appreciated by many of the participants as an important opportunity to 
speak up and have their input regarding the case. “I welcome this 
opportunity here today,” said Mr. Gage, “after waiting 18 years to tell part 
of my story on the results of my exposure to Agent Orange in Vietnam. . . . 
“ And then, repeatedly, “I thank you for the opportunity, this is the first 
time those veterans have had a chance in an orderly manner to present 
their problem to the country . . .”120 
The hearing was meaningful for the sake of both the personal and 
collective voices. “I am proud to have served my country in Vietnam and 
I am proud of my brethren also who have served. We are brothers. Don’t 
make us adversaries. We are already divided on this issue of 
settlement.”121 Many of the veterans’ accounts were group-oriented, 
raising concerns about the problems veterans were facing coming back 
home from war, speaking, for example, about the unique problems 
suffered by female veterans,122 discrimination in employment, or the high 
rate of suicide among veterans. Throughout the hearing, veterans 
applauded speakers who talked about their painful experiences and 
illnesses, they applauded speakers who said they would not give up until 
the issue of Agent Orange was brought to court, and they applauded 
veterans who talked about the debt of the American government towards 
them. 
Although various speakers had different perceptions and hopes from 
the case, the key word, “justice,” was frequently used by most of them. 
They voiced general notions of justice and injustice, fairness, and right 
and wrong. Mainly they used the term justice as a synonym for 
accountability. Justice, in this respect, meant that the country would 
respect, recognize, and properly treat its soldiers, the ones the country was 
poisoning while they were fighting its war. “We served this country as 
118.  Id. at 34.  
119.  Id. at 34.  
120.  Id. at 352.  
121.  Id. at 33.  
122.  Id. at 197.  
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they asked us to and I feel that they owe this to us,”123 said one veteran. 
And one of the lawyers said, “We as people and as a government placed 
these veterans in an area of danger and we are obligated to help them as 
fully as we put their lives at risk.”124 
Perhaps the most poignant account about the injustice inherent in the 
settlement was that of Maureen Ryan, who testified with her daughter 
Kerry sitting in a wheelchair next to her: 
The reality of justice would have included the integrity of a president 
who acknowledged Agent Orange as war incurred. The reality of justice 
would have found a place in the Washington Vietnam veterans memorial 
for the veterans who have died of cancer and the children lost through 
miscarriages from this war agent [. . .] so let us not kid each other about 
the fairness of the settlement. 
[. . .] 
How do we put a dollar figure on a young veteran’s terminal cancer or 
a child’s twisted body? It is not an easy task, but in America it is the 
system we use. This is how Americans settle their differences in a 
civilized manner. This is our way of justice. 
[. . .] 
Kerry, with 22 congenital birth defects, who forever lives in a 
wheelchair, who is denied the right to design her own destiny, who will 
never know the beauty of making love or marrying some great guy, who 
will never know the satisfaction of going to M.I.T. or Harvard, but must 
settle for a special education setting gets $14,000 and you talk about 
justice?125 
This review of the different accounts of litigants and lawyers in the 
hearings breaks down the categories used in analyzing the data—speaking 
about the “self” and the group, speaking about past and future, speaking 
directly to the judge—into actual stories and details. It reveals the 
abundance of opinions, experiences, and emotions expressed throughout 
the hearings. Additionally, this review discloses the seriousness and 
sincerity with which the speakers approached the court. These litigants, 
most of them probably unaccustomed to public speaking, provided 
accounts that were for the most part significant and meaningful. 
Interaction of litigants with judges over substantive issues, however, was 
limited, and such was the actual impact of litigants’ accounts on the 
123.  Id. at 227.  
124.  Id. at 46. 
125.  Id. at 101, 109.  
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outcome. Moreover, we see that judges interacted more with attorneys 
when it came to substantive issues. 
This may raise the question of whether lawyers eventually dominate 
the fairness hearings, designed, inter alia, to overcome agency problems 
within a class action. This is certainly a valid concern, though we should 
also recognize that not all lawyers spoke with one voice. While evidently 
all class counsel supported the settlement, other attorneys expressed a 
range of opinions and interests. From a class action point of view, this 
dynamic reveals the potential of incorporating more attorneys in the 
management of class actions and assigning official roles to attorneys who 
are outside the management committee. Lawyers who worked directly 
with class members were able to bring their clients’ interests before the 
court and to present a voice different from that of the management 
committee. This demonstrates that it is possible to overcome some of the 
agency problems raised by collective litigation through the incorporation 
of more lawyers in the process (which might seem counter-intuitive) so 
that they can better protect the interests of specific class members. 
VII.THE FUNCTION OF THE HEARINGS III: OVERCOMING LEGAL
LIMITATIONS THROUGH A DAY IN COURT 
The three cases studied here vary significantly from one another: 
they vary in the type of legal claims raised, the personal stories that are at 
their background, and the characteristics of the class and of the class 
members. One important feature that differentiates the Welfare Case from 
the other two cases, for example, is that this lawsuit was not about 
monetary compensation, but rather, plaintiffs sought to generate 
institutional reform to better address the needs of the class members. This 
fact may explain both the role taken by the court in this hearing, the 
reactions of class members, and the public nature of the hearing. 
The court in the Welfare Case adopted the role of a problem solver, 
and from the accounts of the speakers in that hearing, it seems that this 
was also the way that they themselves viewed the court’s role. When 
compared with the Agent Orange case, there seems to be much less 
disappointment, or quarrel with the law, and there was much less 
opposition, almost none actually, to the settlement itself. As mentioned 
above, half of the speakers in this hearing did not reference the settlement 
in their accounts. One possible explanation for that difference could be 
that class members in this case, defined as all disabled recipients of 
welfare services in Connecticut, were less organized as a group and 
probably less informed (legally) when compared with class members in 
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the other two cases. Class members in the Welfare Case also did not retain 
their own lawyers, as did some of the class members in the other cases. 
However, notwithstanding these differing characteristics of the 
Welfare Case class, I believe that the significant distinction between the 
Welfare Case and the two other cases was that the Welfare Case 
represented a nonmonetary claim for institutional reform. It is the attempt 
to convey human harm and suffering in monetary terms, which the law 
does so routinely—and which was so dominant in the Holocaust Assets 
and Agent Orange cases—which fails to take into account and respond to 
the great variety of needs and expectations of lay class action litigants. A 
case such as the Welfare Case, which attempts—and succeeds— in 
bringing about actual changes in the welfare system, seems to resonate 
better with class members because it addresses directly some of their real-
life problems. 
Within this context, the added value of the hearing could be that it 
provided class members—who were marginalized both by their 
disabilities and by being poor126— an opportunity to actively and directly 
voice their own concerns before an official decision maker. Considering 
concerns regarding how a system of welfare benefits fails to acknowledge 
the dignity of its recipients and fails to better their conditions in the long 
run, but, instead, renders them passive, dependent, and stigmatized,127 the 
opportunity provided in this hearing for individuals to speak for 
themselves seems particularly significant. The effects of this interaction 
with class members seems to manifest itself in Judge Kravitz’s concluding 
remarks: 
[A]t the end of the day, I think as everybody who spoke today made 
clear, this is all about individuals and one could have the best system in 
the world but it really is a commitment to individuals, the recognition, 
as Ms. Albert said, that she is a human being, that she’s deserving of 
dignity, humanity and respect and she deserves to trust in the agencies 
of the State to help her and every other human being as human beings. 
That that’s the mission that we all have, who are engaged in government 
 126.  The Two are of course closely related: According to the American Community Survey, 
26% of people in the US who identified themselves as having a disability were living under the 
poverty line in 2017. Disability Statistics, Online Resource for U.S. Disability Statistics, Cornell 
University, http://www.disabilitystatistics.org/reports/acs.cfm?statistic=7  [https://perma.cc/TB38-
KTK5]. Last visited, February 27, 2019.  
 127.  See Sagit Mor, Disability and the Persistence of Poverty: Reconstructing Disability 
Allowances, 6 N.W. J. L. & Soc. Pol’y 178 (2011); Doris Zames Fleischer & Frieda Zames, The 
Disability Rights movement: From Charity to Confrontation (2003); Samuel R. Bagenstos, The 
Future of Disability Law, 114 Yale L. J. 1 (2004). 
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service, including meFalse128 
In the Holocaust Assets case, by contrast, the gap between the kind 
of human experiences at the background of the suit and what the law could 
do about them was so vast that it seems that all participants acknowledged 
that there was no way of overcoming it. Participants repeatedly made the 
distinction between legal issues and moral issues, but also seemed to 
accept the fact that the case was about the legal questions and could not 
do much regarding the related moral and historical ones. The law, in that 
case, could offer nothing but compensation, and people were fine with 
getting the money (indeed most speakers supported the settlement). At the 
same time, they intentionally used the hearing itself to achieve some of 
the other goals they were interested in. The hearing seemed to serve as a 
public forum in which people could speak about the Holocaust, the 
families they lost, and their tremendous sufferings. Class members could 
talk about historical justice and morality and about a host of other issues 
while recognizing such issues would not be part of the legal outcome. Put 
differently, this hearing allowed litigants to have a public conversation 
about issues that they thought of as publicly and historically—even if not 
legally—significant. 
The pragmatic attitude that characterized many of the speakers in the 
hearing can be found in Judge Korman’s final decision, where he cited 
another court decision stressing that “it must be understood that the law is 
a tool of limited capacity. Not every wrong, even the worst, is cognizable 
as a legal claim. Indeed, a number of obstacles stand in the path of 
plaintiffs’ claims in this case.”129 The Judge chose to open the decision 
with the words of Ernest Lobet, a Holocaust survivor who spoke at the 
hearing. Words that, according to the judge, provided the best summary 
to his conclusion: 
I have no quarrel with the settlement. I do not say it is fair, because 
fairness is a relative term. No amount of money can possibly be fair 
under those circumstances, but I’m quite sure it is the very best that 
could be done by the groups that negotiated for the settlement. The 
world is not perfect and the people that negotiated I’m sure tried their 
very best, and I think they deserve our cooperation and . . . that they be 
supported and the settlement be approved.130 
The Agent Orange case presents yet a different picture. Vietnam 
veterans had great expectations and great demands from the legal 
128.  Welfare hearing, supra note 39, at 58.  
129.  Id. at 141. 
130.  Id. 
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process—they saw the case as being about all the wrongs they suffered by 
the government and society. They wanted their day in court; they wanted 
the government to say it did them wrong; and they wanted to have answers 
regarding the real affects of Agent Orange. They wanted the court to make 
all those things happen. Theirs was the story of the ideal of the American 
legal system and tort system. But the story of the law was different—it 
evolved around risk allocation, burden of proof, causality, and statute of 
limitations, and it ended in a settlement. 
The gap between their perceptions of the case and the legal issues on 
which it was determined seemed unbridgeable. This was a case in which 
there was a real collision between lay demands and legal realities. 
Interestingly though, what many of the litigants actually wanted was to 
have their day in court. This indicates the veterans’ belief that, in a court 
of law, their cause would prevail. It additionally reveals a refusal on 
veterans’ part to accept the limitations of the law and, in particular, a 
refusal to accept the fact that their case, albeit morally strong, was legally 
weak. In some ways, though, the veterans’ expectations and perceptions 
of the legal process were not completely unrealistic. While litigation could 
not achieve all of their hopes nor fix all of the wrongs inflicted upon them, 
it could theoretically provide them with better answers than a settlement. 
The disappointment of the veterans was because the law did not live up to 
its own aspirations, and it failed to provide the basic legal function of an 
open, adversarial discussion of the merits. Settlement is an inseparable 
part of our legal reality.131 It has many advantages, and it could certainly 
be that this particular settlement was the most that the veterans could 
realistically achieve. What the Agent Orange hearings reveal, however, is 
that what most lawyers consider to be a necessary compromise could be 
upsetting to many litigants. At the same time, that the class members’ 
demand for a trial is rejected by their own lawyers as well as the court 
reveals how some very basic lay perceptions of the law are similarly 
unacceptable to many legal actors. 
What Judge Weinstein did that was significantly different from the 
two other judges was openly deal with that tension and acknowledge the 
non-legal concerns of the class. Of the three judges, Judge Weinstein was 
the most honest regarding the constraints of the law in its ability to deal 
with the veterans’ claims. He was the most open about the limits of his 
own capacity as a judge to actually help the veterans. Like Judge Kravitz 
 131.  Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in 
Federal and State Courts, 1 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 459 (2004); Marc Galanter, The Hundred-Year 
Decline of Trials and the Thirty Years War, 57 Stanford L. Rev. 1255 (2004). 
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in the Holocaust Assets case, Judge Weinstein did not shy away from 
interacting with the class members or displaying empathy. The hearing, 
in this case, provided a venue through which the court would address the 
perceptions of the class members. This venue seems important, especially 
in a case in which, as Weinstein himself wrote in his final decision, the 
law was too limited to deal with what were, probably in the judge’s eyes 
too, the just demands and needs of the group. 
Vietnam veterans and their families desperately want this suit to 
demonstrate how they have been mistreated by the country they love. 
They want it to give them the respect they have earned. They want it to 
protect the public against future harm by the government and chemical 
companies. They want a jury ‘once-and-for-all’ to demonstrate the 
connection between Agent Orange and the physical, mental and 
emotional problems from which many of them clearly suffer. The court 
has been deeply moved by its contact with members of the plaintiffs’ 
class from all over the nation and abroad. Many do deserve better of 
their country. Had this court the power to rectify past wrongs – actual or 
perceived – it would do so. But no single litigation can lift all of 
plaintiffs’ burdens.132 
VIII.CONCLUSION: BETWEEN LEGAL EFFECTIVENESS AND LEGAL
MEANING, BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE 
The inclusion of non-legal perceptions within legal procedures may 
raise various difficulties and concerns. One significant concern is that the 
inclusion of lay perceptions in the form of extra-legal evidence (i.e., 
evidence that is typically or traditionally defined as legally irrelevant) 
might have an undesirable effect on the process, in general, and on the 
decision maker, in particular. Such evidence may divert the legal 
discussion from its rational, facts-and-norms-based nature to include 
irrelevant, irrational, and emotional influences. The participation of lay 
class members in fairness hearings, as found in this study, may raise very 
different concerns. While class members indeed recount stories which are 
emotionally powerful and make claims that are morally strong, this study 
shows that the hearings have very little impact on the actual legal outcome 
of cases. While judges might be moved by such testimony, the complexity 
of collective litigation and of the legal claims involved in such litigation 
as well as the investment of lawyers and judges in the proposed 
settlements all make it virtually impossible to significantly alter the 
outcome of a settled class action in a fairness hearing. This distinctive 
132.  In re Agent Orange Product Liability, 597 F. Supp. 740, 747 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). 
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combination of a procedure which, on one hand, allows for the significant 
presentation of non-legal accounts, but, on the other hand, does not allow 
these accounts to meaningfully impact the outcome, displays its own 
unique concerns and objections. The issue is not whether certain evidence 
or lay perceptions should be allowed into the legal process, but rather, the 
value of incorporating such extra-legal perceptions into a legal procedures 
in which decisions are made, at the end of the day, according to the law. 
What is the value of what some may refer to as “symbolic” participation 
of individuals within mass litigation procedures? 
Based on the findings presented in this study, I want to suggest 
several different ways in which I find this type of participation meaningful 
rather than symbolic. Considering the social, cultural, and historical 
dimensions of adjudication, participation in the hearings should be viewed 
as meaningful as long as it satisfies the requirements of respect towards 
participants and relatively free expression. In addition to satisfying 
individuals’ psychological need to be included and heard and allowing 
participants to take part in procedures that affect their lives, such lay 
participation in legal procedures is meaningful in that it presents an 
opportunity for reclaiming legal space and legal discourse. Lay expression 
within legal settings is meaningful in that it becomes part of the various 
social meanings and narratives that the legal process generates and 
transmits. 
Examining the value of participation within legal procedures 
exclusively through the prism of an actual impact on the final decision 
denies the fact that procedures have an array of outcomes, only one of 
which is the final decision of the judge. It denies the central role of 
procedures in both reflecting and constructing our social world. It ignores 
the significance of the social and cultural domains of litigation and of law. 
With respect to class actions, it is in the nature of such cases that they 
often deal with widespread, common, and often significant social 
phenomena (mass torts, institutional reform, discrimination). At the same 
time, it is also in the nature of class actions that they often end in a 
settlement. It is, therefore, in these cases that deal with significant social 
problems—cases that could influence the lives of many individuals and 
that involve norms and values—it is in these cases that we often waive 
adjudication with all its implications, including truth-seeking, lawmaking, 
norm-generation, precedent, public debate, consideration, and reflection 
over questions of public significance and interests.133 The fairness 
hearings are significant because they partly make up for that “loss.” In an 
133.  See generally Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Yale L.J. 1073 (1984).  
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era that does not offer many such deliberative opportunities, the hearings 
provide a forum for public discussion;134 they allow people an opportunity 
to speak up and to listen to one another; they bring to the open stories and 
facts; they let litigants criticize their lawyers, the courts, and the justice 
system. In all of these ways, the hearings fulfill some of the functions of 
adjudication—functions that are often abandoned in favor of settlement. 
It could be argued that the court is not the suitable arena in which to 
hold such non-legal deliberation regardless of its value. Such an argument, 
however, relies on a narrow definition of legal process and ignores a host 
of functions that courts could and should fulfill. Taking the Agent Orange 
case, for instance, it is not surprising it has become “the trial” of the 
Vietnam War. The law has this capacity to capture the public attention 
and the hopes of those who are hurt. It holds promises and creates high 
expectations for those who turn to litigation as a way to remedy social 
injustice. It could be the unique role that courts play in the American 
culture, or it might also be the deficiency in other public institutions and 
forums that could provide opportunities for meaningful public 
deliberation and redress. The Agent Orange litigation can be viewed as a 
major disappointment for veterans. The hearing itself, however, attained 
its purpose: it granted the veterans their day in court—a priceless 
opportunity to communicate freely and openly with state authority and 
other legal and non-legal actors about the horrors of war and its 
horrendous effects. 
The underlying assumption of this work has been that the law is a 
tool of limited capacity in its ability to accurately and faithfully represent 
human reality. The gap between concept and reality is indeed unavoidable 
and mostly irreconcilable. At the same time, the law is also an ongoing, 
developing project. Legal definitions and categories change and should 
indeed continue to change with social and technological developments. 
To this end, the boundaries between the legal and the extra-legal should 
remain open and flexible. The fairness hearing permits precisely that by 
making these boundaries visible and, through challenging them, enlarging 
the sphere of interaction between legal and non-legal perceptions, thus 
creating opportunities for reciprocal influence of these two spheres. 
We have seen that participants attend the fairness hearings to tell 
their stories and to voice their views and expectations. These stories are 
often irrelevant in mere legal terms, and the participants’ expectations 
often go well beyond the limits of the case and the judge’s authority. 
 134.  Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Scaling up Deliberative Democracy as Dispute Resolution in 
Healthcare Reform: A Work in Progress, 74 L. & Cont. Prob. 1 (2011).  
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Those participants, however, do bring the outdoors into the courtroom. 
Although this may not alter legal outcomes, the inclusion of the external 
perspective, nonetheless, invests the hearings with significant meaning. It 
is this inclusion that reveals the tension between what the law is and what 
it is not. It creates a dialogue, in other words, between lay actors and legal 
actors about the meaning of law, about what belongs to the legal process 
and what does not, and about what should and should not take place in a 
courtroom. This dialogue forces the court to face lay perceptions and lay 
demands. At the same time, it confronts the individuals who participate in 
the hearings, perhaps even the public in general, with the realities and 
limitations of the legal process. Thus, the dialogue helps to question the 
boundaries set by the law. It may present both sides with a new insight 
and understanding in relation to the legal process and new possibilities for 
what adjudication is and what it could do. 
Finally, I wish to address one additional capacity of the legal process. 
It is a forum through which private and social history and memory are 
constructed. Legal procedures often deal with various versions and 
presentations of events of the past in order to produce legal outcomes that 
will affect the future. In doing so, legal procedures create a public arena 
in which different accounts of history are presented and through which a 
social memory is fashioned. “[M]emory, private and individual, as much 
as collective and cultural is constructed, not reproduced . . . [T]his 
construction is not made in isolation but in conversations with others that 
occur in the contexts of community, broader politics, and social 
dynamics.”135 When examining the fairness hearings, a significant finding 
emerges: all speakers chose to speak about the past. Presenting one’s own 
personal history, or a universal history, seems to have been a desire shared 
by all those who participated in the hearings (lawyers and litigants alike). 
The accumulation of the various testimonies contributed to the 
commemoration of the historic events at the heart of these lawsuits and to 
the redefinition of certain events in the collective memory and 
consciousness. 
The historical potential of the legal process and of the public hearing 
was actually mentioned by a few of the speakers at the Holocaust hearing, 
but it is true of any legal procedure. The participation of Vietnam veterans 
in the Agent Orange hearing and of Holocaust victims in the Holocaust 
Assets hearing, as well as the participation of disabled people in the 
 135.  Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns, Writing History and Registering Memory in Legal 
Decisions and Legal Practices: An Introduction, in: Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns, eds. History, 
Memory, and the Law, 11 (1999).  
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Welfare Case, leaves behind a transcribed record which may be revealed, 
read, and studied. In doing so, the participation in these hearings fulfills 
the very basic need of so many litigants, which is the need to be heard—
presented so powerfully in the words of Vietnam veteran David McMurry 
during the Agent Orange hearing: “For many of us this is the only forum 
to say we hurt emotionally, socially, spiritually and physically. [. . .] We 
say to you, please at least hear us and continue to hear us and let everyone 
hear us.”136 
136.  Agent Orange hearing, supra note 41, at 97.  
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